Senator Marco Rubio | Official U.S. House headshot
Senator Marco Rubio | Official U.S. House headshot
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is reportedly failing to prevent Communist China from accessing advanced chip technology produced in the United States. Despite public assertions of a tough stance on China, recent reports suggest that the Biden-Harris Administration's actions may not align with its rhetoric.
A report by the Wall Street Journal indicated that Communist China has been receiving thousands of advanced chips annually through third-party vendors. Additionally, the New York Times uncovered an operation involving organizations linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which have been circumventing U.S. export controls to acquire these technologies.
U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) addressed a letter to U.S. Department of Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo, criticizing BIS for its inability to prevent American semiconductor technology from being accessed by Communist China.
“These semiconductors have widespread military application, fueling capabilities such as artificial intelligence to provide militaries with an edge on the battlefield, something [Communist China] itself has written extensively on. Preventing America’s adversaries from weaponizing these components for nefarious purposes is vital to our national security,” stated Rubio in his letter.
Rubio expressed concerns over significant weaknesses in export controls that enable companies connected to the Chinese Communist Party's armed wing, the PLA, to access cutting-edge semiconductor technology developed in the United States.
"Semiconductors remain the lifeblood of the 21st century’s technological revolution," Rubio wrote. "Preventing America’s adversaries from weaponizing these components for nefarious purposes is vital to our national security."
Despite current restrictions on advanced chips, a July 2024 report from the Wall Street Journal exposed that 70 PRC-based entities import thousands of Nvidia’s advanced artificial intelligence chips annually and distribute them to PLA-affiliated entities restricted by BIS. Many entities reportedly acquire dozens of advanced chips monthly via third-party vendors and offer preorder options weeks in advance.
The New York Times also reported on a semiconductor black market in Shenzhen, detailing procurement documents suggesting more than a dozen PRC-affiliated entities purchased high-end semiconductors against U.S. export controls.
In response to inquiries about these failures, Secretary Raimondo admitted she was under “no illusions that we are doing it perfectly.” However, Rubio criticized BIS under her leadership for failing to match strong rhetoric with effective measures preventing sensitive technologies from reaching adversaries.
Rubio suggested adopting a blanket “presumption of denial” posture for export license applications involving any entity based in PRC due to high risks associated with circumventing export controls. He referenced his introduction of the Depriving Enemy Nations of Integral Authorizations and Licenses (DENIAL) Act last year but emphasized that existing authority under the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 allows immediate policy changes.
“Any serious effort to deny America’s adversaries access to powerful technologies mandates an unwavering export regime,” Rubio asserted, urging BIS to address semiconductor leakage promptly.